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Family Involvement and Corporate Social Responsibility in Small- and 





This study investigates how family involvement affects engagement of private small- and 
medium-sized family firms in corporate social responsibility. We draw on reputation and self-
interest arguments to hypothesize and test the effects of degree of family ownership, intra-
family ownership dispersion, and family generation in control on firm engagement in 
corporate social responsibility. Using survey data collected from a sample of 136 Italian 
small- and medium-sized family firms, we find support for our hypotheses and underlying 
contention that family involvement matters, as CSR engagement decreases if a higher 
percentage of shares is owned by the family, ownership is dispersed among a higher number 
of family members, as well as later-generations control the business. We conclude by 
discussing the study’s implications for theory and practice, limitations, and future research 
directions. 
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The corporate world pays increasing attention to face social issues, as firms care and spend 
resources and efforts towards environmental protection, safety and health of employees, 
welfare and well-being of their communities, and in general to behave as responsible 
corporate citizens (Matten and Crane, 2005). Research has addressed this topic for decades, 
and several concepts emerged in different fields, from social entrepreneurship to corporate 
social responsibility, from social innovation to stakeholder management. The boundaries 
among these concepts are blurred, and strongly dependent on the theoretical lenses adopted as 
well as the streams of literature considered. Management, entrepreneurship, business ethics 
are instances of different fields, which definitely makes the topic multidisciplinary. While a 
focus on Social Entrepreneurship, and the difficulties to define it and its main discussion 
areas, mainly refers to the mainstream entrepreneurship field (Mair and Marti, 2006; Peredo 
and McLean, 2006; see recent research avenues as reviewed by Pierre, von Friedrichs, and 
Wincent, 2014), the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) belongs to other fields 
of research. The main difference relies on whether a social or a commercial aim is pursued by 
the organization. While social entrepreneurship deals with entrepreneurial activities with an 
embedded social purpose and driven to create social value, CSR pertains to the realm of 
ventures whose ultimate scope is to generate and increase personal and shareholder wealth 
(Austin, Stevenson, and Wei-Skillern, 2006). Thus, social entrepreneurship is broadly defined 
as the “process of creating value by combining resources in new ways that are intended 
primarily to exploit opportunities for creating social value” (Pierre et al., 2014: 44), and only 
currently the debate has centered around the extent to which social enterprises should pursue 
also commercial aims (e.g., Lundström and Zhou, 2014). Corporate social responsibility, 
instead, is meant as an evolving corporate strategy, which has an increasing importance 
among the (for-profit) firm activities (Carroll and Shabana, 2010). CSR, which is the focus of 
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this chapter, has been debated for long time in literature and the concept has evolved from 
claiming that the only responsibility of a business is to make profits (Friedman, 1979) to 
emphasizing the volunteering character of corporate initiatives aimed at benefiting its 
stakeholders and society, beyond any legal requirements (e.g., Crane and Matten, 2007; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). In this study, we adopt a definition of CSR consistent with 
this latest idea of accomplishing initiatives beyond what is required by law: “A firm is 
socially responsible if it commits to integrate social and environmental concerns in its 
business operations and in its interaction with the stakeholders on a voluntary basis” 
(European Commission, 2011). This definition embeds both the volunteering aspect of 
responsible actions undertaken by firms and the strategic stakeholder management of private 
businesses. 
In management studies, the focus is especially on the analysis of the factors determining 
the extent to which firms engage in socially responsible practices. One of the most discussed 
factors is size: there are studies focusing on the differences between large corporations and 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for instance, with respect to the level of 
knowledge of the topic, the extent to which CSR is integrated into the actual firm activities 
and disseminated among the corporate stakeholders (Blombäck and Wigren, 2009). Recently 
a debate has arisen on the relevance that SMEs place on these issues, since they are often 
acknowledged to be unaware of CSR in terms of formal definition and concept, although they 
are actually involved in some socially responsible activities (Russo and Perrini, 2010), and it 
thus seems that they do not perceive it as part of their strategy, or at least as an important 
activity for the sustainability of the firm. This debate can be further enriched considering the 
family business context, where the presence of a family involved in the business activities 
may directly influence the importance of socially responsible activities for the family business 
itself (e.g., Campopiano and De Massis, 2015). Whether a family firm is more or less engaged 
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in CSR activities is indeed especially related to the idiosyncratic characteristics of this form of 
business organization, defined as a firm owned and managed by a family or a small group of 
families in order to pursue the vision of the business and to be sustainable across generations 
(Chua, Chrisman, and Sharma 1999). The overlap of ownership, family and business systems 
(Tagiuri and Davis, 1996) may affect the definition of the above mentioned vision (De 
Massis, Kotlar, Chua, and Chrisman, 2014) and thus also whether engaging in socially 
responsible activities may be relevant or not.  
Overall, research on corporate social responsibility has suggested that, beyond size, a 
number of factors may affect the commitment of firms, and in particular SMEs, to corporate 
social responsibility, such as the motivations to engage in socially responsible activities (e.g., 
Campopiano, Da Massis, and Cassia, 2012), the industry in which the firm operates, whether 
the firm specifically serves business or consumer markets, the country of origin, and whether 
the firm works in a developing or industrialized world, which can be considered as 
meaningful drivers of CSR strategies (Blombäck and Wigren, 2009). Considering the 
relationship between factors related to the ownership and governance of the firm and CSR 
engagement may further improve our understanding of family firms’ behavior. Indeed, few 
studies consider family involvement in a firm as an antecedent of CSR behavior (Adams et 
al., 1996; Berrone et al., 2010; Deniz and Suarez, 2005; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Niehm et 
al., 2008; Uhlaner et al., 2004), CSR reporting (Campopiano and De Massis, 2015), 
philanthropic engagement (Atkinson and Galaskiewicz, 1988; Campopiano, De Massis, and 
Chirico, 2014; Litz and Stewart, 2000), and the role of values in CSR engagement (e.g., 
Marques, Presas, and Simon, 2014). These studies mainly rely on arguments based on 
different theoretical premises to assess family firms’ behavior towards CSR, discuss if they 
are more or less ethical or socially concerned than non-family firms, and uncover whether and 
why family firms are a heterogeneous sample with respect to CSR. Results are contrasting 
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and we argue that the involvement of the family in the business is an important explanatory 
variable to predict CSR engagement of small- and medium-sized family businesses. 
In an attempt to fill an existing gap in the literature, this study aims to investigate how 
family involvement affects engagement of private small- and medium-sized family firms in 
corporate social responsibility. In the next section, we provide the theoretical arguments used 
to build the hypotheses; the third section presents the methodology adopted to collect data and 
perform the analyses; the fourth section shows the results, while the fifth one provides a 
discussion. The last section outlines the conclusions, acknowledges the limitations of the 
study, and draws future research directions. 
2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses Development 
Literature on corporate social responsibility in family business has been rooted on different 
and contrasting theories. Family firms’ conduct, with respect to the whole set of stakeholders, 
is dependent on a number of factors and cannot neglect the presence of the family as one of 
the stakeholders involved. The simultaneous presence of ownership, family and business 
systems may affect family firms’ behavior towards CSR, and the main element affecting the 
extent to which a business is considered highly intertwined with the family is family 
involvement, which widely varies in terms of degree of family ownership, intra-family 
ownership dispersion, and generation controlling the business, thus making family firms 
heterogeneous (De Massis et al., 2013; De Massis et al., 2014a Sciascia and Mazzola, 2008). 
In our attempt to take into account ongoing debates on family business social conduct 
and overcome the limitations of this literature, we rely on two different theoretical lenses. 
More specifically, we propose that two concepts, i.e. reputation and self-interest, already 
adopted as theoretical lenses in the family business field (e.g., Chen et al., 2008; Danes et al., 
2008; Dyer and Whetten, 2006; Miller et al., 2008; Niehm et al., 2008) are useful to address 
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the issue under investigation and offer a contribution to literature. These two elements have 
their roots in legitimacy and agency theories respectively, and can thus help to explain the 
phenomenon from two different, but complementary, perspectives. Moreover, reputation on 
the one side and self-interest on the other have been widely used in extant literature as 
relevant elements that can be borrowed to investigate the issues at a corporate level, since we 
refer to corporate reputation and self-interest in terms of benefits that the family business can 
earn from CSR engagement. 
2.1 Reputation 
One of the main arguments supporting that family firms have an incentive to engage in 
corporate social responsibility refers to their propensity to build and maintaining their 
reputation so as to be legitimated in the communities in which the firm operates. Corporate 
reputation is built on the idea that a firm is assigned a positive reputation because of a number 
of desirable characteristics (Davies et al., 2003; Fombrun, 1996). Stakeholders, therefore, 
assess the firm’s actions and update their view of the firm and its character in the light of 
these actions. As legitimacy theory suggests, firms that want to build a good reputation 
certainly face a critical strategic issue, and thus need to find ways to improve their existing 
reputation and avoid unintentionally damaging it (Love and Kraatz, 2009). Literature depicts 
three different perspectives on reputation: (i) positive reputation is assigned to firms that have 
traits that are highly valued since they may be considered as predictors of the firms’ future 
behavior (Fombrun and Van Riel, 2004); (ii) good reputation is given to firms with an 
organization’s symbolic conformity with institutional, context-specific standards and 
categories; and (iii) high reputation is closely tied to organizational outputs, such as high 
quality products and services, and great financial results (Shapiro, 1983). 
Private small- and medium-sized firms, especially, put great emphasis on the reputation 
that the community and the firm’s stakeholders have of the firm (e.g., Carter and Dukerich, 
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1998; Dowling, 1986; Fombrun, 1996). Moreover, a firm’s reputation is acknowledged to be 
affected by quality of management, company’s financial soundness and its demonstration of 
social concerns, so that reputation is useful to enhance the long-term sustainability of a 
business (Barney, 1991; Eddleston, Kellermanns, and Sarathy, 2008; James, 2006; Morris et 
al., 1997); furthermore, it also supports market share during industry downturns and increases 
the stability of the business (Fombrun, 1996). 
This is even more relevant for family firms that have incentives to be socially 
responsible in order to maintain a positive image, since a good reputation among the key 
stakeholders may be considered as a form of social insurance, protecting not only the firm’s 
but also the family’s assets in times of crisis (Dunn, 1996; Godfrey, 2005; Whetten and 
Mackey, 2005). More attention to foster a good reputation of the business is one of the ways a 
family business may nurture its continuity in the long-run (Miller et al., 2008). In addition, the 
importance of reputation is even exacerbated for family firms, since family wealth is usually 
intertwined with their business success, the family name is usually associated with the 
business (Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013), and the investment of the family into the 
business is often quite difficult to be liquidated with respect, for example, to an investment 
into a public company (Wiklund, 2006). 
However, previous studies have found that not all family firms are equally concerned 
with CSR, and they are heterogeneous with respect to their attitudes towards social issues. For 
instance, Deniz and Suarez (2005) in their study classified family firms according to the 
different degrees of engagement in CSR activities. Reputation among the main stakeholders 
of the firm can therefore be a main aim that the family business wants to pursue through its 
engagement in CSR. It is not trivial, however, that all family businesses consider CSR as the 
best investment in order to build and maintain a reputation, and even the relevance of 




A second element that plays an important role in explaining family firms’ social 
conduct is self-interest, highly related to family altruism. Rooted in the agency theory, from a 
utilitarian point of view, altruism plays the role of connector between the welfare of one 
individual and that of others (Schulze et al., 2003b). It is a concept that well suits family 
firms, where for example parents exhibit high levels of benevolence with respect to their 
children not only because they are closely linked, but also because their own interests, and 
those of the business, would be damaged if they act less benevolently (Karra et al., 2006). 
Therefore, they are basically self-interested, since they want to protect their own interests 
(Morck and Yeung, 2004), and their conduct may result in behaviors that could disadvantage 
company employees and other stakeholders, or in competing in the marketplace in ways that 
could be clearly harmful (Schulze et al., 2001). Accordingly, family altruism is defined as the 
powerful force within family life and, by extension, within the family business, that on the 
one hand makes the parents care for their offspring, makes family members consider each 
other, and fosters loyalty and commitment to the family and firm; but on the other hand gives 
both parents and children incentives to take actions that can threaten the welfare of the family 
and firm (Schulze et al., 2003b: 474). Family altruism may thus be harmful for the firm if the 
family and friends’ interests prevail over business ones when, for example, the family hires 
and holds unqualified managers and employees just because of blood ties (Schultze et al., 
2003b).  
On the one hand, according to the family altruism perspective, self-interested family 
firms may disregard engagement in CSR as a core objective of their firm and do not consider 
it at all among its strategic and operative activities; on the other hand, a positive view of 
family altruism allows to take into high consideration the sustainability of the family business, 
that will be transferred to future generations. This behavior of family firms is referred in 
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literature as stewardship towards the family business, since the owners of the firm care about 
the future of young generations and their business (Miller et al., 2008), so that CSR may be 
considered as a viable way to achieve this goal. We argue that the presence of a family in a 
business is an important factor to understand whether and why family firms engage in CSR. 
In sum, in literature there are contrasting arguments that attempt to predict family 
business behavior. We aim to find out whether and to what extent different dimensions of 
family involvement in the business affect private small- and medium-sized family firms’ 
engagement in corporate social responsibility. 
2.3 Hypotheses 
The arguments examined above suggest that family firms behave differently from non-
family firms depending on the importance they attach to reputation and self-interest, since 
these two elements emerge from prior literature as critically important in explaining family 
firms’ corporate behavior and provide arguments to predict CSR engagement in family firms. 
The role played by the degree of involvement of the family in the business deserves specific 
attention in order to discuss the socially responsible behavior of the family firm. 
The degree of family involvement in ownership may indeed affect engagement in CSR 
and thus the relationships with firm stakeholders. Even if it has been stated that the presence 
of the family within the shareholders pool increases the importance of family reputation in the 
community, whether the family controls a small or large fraction of the business makes a 
difference. When family ownership is low, the family itself is not the only actor to shape the 
firm strategy, and there may be different interests resulting in possible owner-owner agency 
problems, if the owners of the family business exploit their information and pursue their own 
interests to the detriment of other shareholders (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006; Morck et al., 
2005; Wasserman, 2006). Non-family shareholders may therefore prioritize business interests 
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over family control goals, as the group of shareholders is overall less susceptible to family 
relationships, and thus more likely to create robust connections with other business 
stakeholders (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011). In this context, family members can make 
decisions that increase their personal wealth, for example requiring high dividends at the end 
of the year (Schulze et al., 2003a), thus reducing the possibility to invest in social issues and 
making family altruism overwhelm the potential benefits of reputational gains. Conversely, 
CSR may become a means to build and hold the relationships with firm stakeholders, so that 
family owners care about the business and thus avoid potential conflicts with the other 
shareholders prioritizing in the meantime the family business reputation.  
Where family control of votes is significant, instead, the owners no longer feel any 
pressure to meet external stakeholders’ claims (Miller, Le Breton-Miller, and Lester, 2013), 
and they can put in practice the strategies that better suit their own parochial interests (Morck 
et al., 2005). In fact, with high family ownership, family ties among firm owners have priority 
over ties with organizational stakeholders such as employees, customers, suppliers and 
competitors (Granovetter, 1985; Uzzi, 1996), since family identity, values, and goals will 
definitively affect business conduct, because of the strong structural ties among family 
members (Stryker, 1987). CSR in this case may lose its importance and it may thus be more 
likely that family firms, where substantial equity is in the hands of the family, disregard and 
neglect corporate social responsibility in their firm, preferring a self-interested family agenda. 
Overall, these arguments suggest that while reputational considerations lead family firms with 
a low degree of family ownership to engage in CSR, self-interest is the prioritized driver of 
avoiding CSR in case of high degree of family ownership, that can be summarized in the first 
hypothesis as follows: 




Another important aspect of family involvement is intra-family ownership dispersion, 
i.e. the dispersion of family ownership among family members (e.g., De Massis et al., 2013). 
Taking into account arguments related to self-interest can help understand how family 
ownership dispersion may affect the social conduct of family firms. Indeed, when the shares 
are concentrated in the hands of a single owner or a small group of owners, there is a strong 
link, nurtured by family altruism, between the controlling owners’ wealth and that of the 
family (Schulze et al., 2001), since one of their main interests is to maximize both the 
family’s and the firm’s welfare. In addition, a relevant share of family wealth is tied to the 
firm, so it is more likely to invest to generate further wealth (Wiklund, 2006). A family 
business with ownership highly concentrated among a very few number of family 
shareholders, in fact, has a long-term perspective because there is usually a greater propensity 
for the owner(s) to hand the business over to the offspring (Miller and Le Breton-Miller, 
2005). Family wealth, career opportunities and corporate reputation are all linked with firm 
success, so that there might be a greater inclination of family firm owners to care about the 
long-term interests of all the stakeholders, not only family members. Moreover, it is more 
likely that family firms invest in building a positive moral capital, in order to prevent both the 
firm and the family from being acknowledged as irresponsible citizens when risks for their 
reputation in the community may emerge (Dyer and Whetten, 2006). 
As ownership gets dispersed among siblings or cousins, new dynamics emerge and 
affect the CSR strategies accomplished by family firms. Indeed, new agency issues may 
hinder the performance of private small- and medium-sized family firms and imply changes 
to their conduct. Family members who have become new shareholders may claim a legitimate 
stake in the ownership of the firm, by inheriting it (Stark and Falk, 1998). They may consider 
CSR as an unnecessary and wasteful activity, since it is their dividends that might be kept in 
the business to invest in CSR. Then, when family ownership gets further dispersed among 
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multiple members of the extended family, these owners usually occupy different roles and 
thus have diverse incentives and goals (Kotlar and De Massis, 2013). Solving goals 
misalignment and governing the several roles of family members in the family and the 
business allows family firms to pursue a common purpose (De Massis, Chirico, Kotlar and 
Naldi, 2014), i.e. to enhance firm’s reputation by investing in social issues, thus agreeing on 
unique long-term gains that the business may benefit from. However, usually only a small 
portion of owners is likely to be directly involved in the company’s operations and, on the 
other hand, each family member is likely to invest only a fractional part of her/his wealth in 
the family firm (Gersick et al., 1997). In this circumstance, the family firm must respond to 
the claims of both family owners involved and those not involved in the business, which are 
likely to be driven by different motivations (Schulze et al., 2003a). It may therefore be more 
difficult to run the business because of possible conflicts that make family issues, politics and 
agreements be the priority over corporate activities (Pratt and Foreman, 2000). CSR may thus 
be overshadowed in these cases, despite the importance attached to reputation by the family. 
In light of the foregoing: 
Hypothesis 2. In family firms, intra-family ownership dispersion negatively affects 
engagement in CSR. 
Finally, considering which generation controls the business can be important to predict 
family firms’ engagement in CSR. Generation in control usually implies the increase in the 
number of family members taking part in the business activities, but more notably it entails 
the presence of emotional linkages among family members (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011). 
This is especially true in first generation family firms, where family members involved in the 
business aim to build a sustainable business to be passed to their offspring with whom they 
share everyday life and experience. In this case, reputation is expected to be extremely 
important, since it allows the family (and the firm) to be labeled as good corporate citizen; the 
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founder is committed to build a solid and profitable business, and thus personally manage the 
relationships with the main stakeholders, especially employees, suppliers, and customers. The 
set of these business relationships are often based on personal bonds, and thus they constitute 
the social capital that becomes part of the heritage which is handed over to the second 
generation. Therefore we expect a high attention paid by the founder to socially responsible 
practices to build a good reputation for the business and the family and to create and hold 
good relationships, particularly with proximate stakeholders. The second generation is usually 
characterized by the presence of siblings who own and manage the family firm. They are 
grown-up in the family business; they share the same values, principles, and norms of their 
fathers/mothers, and thus have even more interest in perpetuating what the founder generation 
started up. There is a strong feeling to carry out what they have inherited: reputation plays in 
this context a relevant role, because second generation is still committed to raise the image of 
the family business and nurture stakeholders’ relationships in a more strategic way with 
respect to their predecessors. We expect that building and maintaining the reputation, not only 
in terms of organizational character, but also in terms of symbolic conformity and technical 
efficacy, becomes a priority for second-generation family firms. Finally, family members in 
later-generations are usually less committed, and thus business interests may displace the 
family’s ones (Le Breton-Miller et al., 2011); moreover, they are usually less talented and 
entrepreneurial than the former generations (James, 2006), so that it is likely that they rely on 
more formal and structured ways to manage the external relationships and minimize the 
efforts towards social activities. In this situation firms may engage less in CSR with respect to 
prior generation family firms. 




To summarize, our hypothesized conceptual model is presented in Figure 1, which 
proposes the relationships between the different dimensions of family involvement in the 
business and engagement in CSR, as described above. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Sample and survey measures 
The 136 firms surveyed for this study were drawn from a list of approximately 4000 
firms in the Lombardy region, in Northern Italy, selected in order to obtain a homogeneous 
sample, because previous studies using Italian companies found a significant effect of the 
geographical location on firm performance (Caselli and Di Giuli, 2010; De Massis et al., 
2014a). Businesses were selected for inclusion in this list if they have sales between 2 and 50 
million Euros and a number of employees in the range between 10 and 250, as suggested by 
the thresholds set by the European commission. 
The survey was conducted as a self-administered questionnaire e-mailed to the contact 
list. The survey instrument was designed drawing on the contributions provided in past 
research on family business and corporate social responsibility. It was first tested through a 
pilot study on a small sample, calculating the Crombach’s alpha (α) to measure construct 
reliability, obtaining values higher than 0.7, that is considered an acceptable value. Therefore, 
the questions eventually selected for the survey were based on the research team’s collective 
experience working with family businesses as well as the pretest results. Responses were 
representative of the target population in terms of geography, sales, and industry type, thus, 
observations were not weighted. 
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The questionnaire was organized as follows. Section 1 reported questions that sought to 
obtain general business and demographic information about the firm, which were then 
triangulated through a research of the firms in the Amadeus database. Section 2 queried 
respondents on the distinctive characteristics of family-owned firms, including the percentage 
of business ownership shared by family members, number of family members employed full 
time in the business, and family generation involved in the business. Section 3 asked 
respondents about their reasons for joining the family-owned business, their intentions and 
their perceptions of trust and pride to work in the family business. Five separate items 
appeared in this section of the survey with Likert-type scales used to measure the importance 
level of each item (1 = Extremely Unimportant, 5 = Extremely Important). 
3.2 Variables 
The dependent variable is Engagement in CSR, that we measured by asking the CEO if 
the firm accomplishes any CSR initiatives according to the CSR definition reported in Italy in 
the Green Book, a document provided by the European Commission (2011). The following 
definition: “A concept whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in 
their business operations and in their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary 
basis” is conveyed in Italy through its translation into Italian. Each firm’s respondent was 
asked in the survey if any social initiatives are performed, so that a dummy variable was 
computed as a proxy of engagement in CSR within the firm. We also checked that in all the 
cases the respondent to the survey was involved in the top management of the firm, in order to 
assert that (s)he was aware of the firm’s activities at any level. 
The independent variables included family firm measures. Family involvement in 
ownership is operationalized through the measure of the total percentage of shares owned by 
the family, namely family ownership concentration. It is a continuous measure of family 
involvement and to be accountable as a family firm two thresholds have to be overcome: (i) at 
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least one family member serves in the top management team; and (ii) at least 5 per cent of the 
shares are owned by the family. Although different researches adopt diverse thresholds for the 
latter, these two criteria are the most used to identify family firms in the field (De Massis et 
al., 2012). All firms that do not satisfy the ownership and control criteria above mentioned are 
considered as non-family firms, and are assigned value 0. We adopted dummy variables with 
different thresholds of family ownership concentration as alternative family firm measures to 
be used in robustness check. The second measure is the number of owners belonging to the 
family, which is used as a proxy of the dispersion of ownership among the members of the 
family (Bertrand et al., 2008; De Massis et al., 2014a). 
We considered the number of generations as a variable that encompasses the social and 
human capital that have been generated and transferred through a number of generational 
shifts. In particular, we created three dummy variables: the first one takes value 1 when the 
family firm is in the first generation, controlled by the founder, and 0 otherwise; the second 
one takes value 1 when there is the second generation who owns the family firm, and 0 
otherwise; and finally, the last one takes value 1 when the owning generation is greater or 
equal than 3, and 0 otherwise (Davis and Harveston, 2001). 
We also included a number of control variables. We considered the numbers of years 
from the incorporation as a measure for the age of the firm. The natural logarithm of firm 
sales was used to control for firm size; we also collected information on the number of 
employees and the firm total assets in order to perform sensitivity analyses with alternative 
measures of firm size. We used the lagged variation of ROE to consider the remuneration of 
shareholders’ equity. We introduced a dummy variable to control for industry, coding the 
firms in the sample according to their belonging to manufacturing and non-manufacturing 
industries, used to cluster data. Finally, we included the degree of agreement with family 
goals, future plans and corporate strategies; and the adoption of beneficial practices for 
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employees, i.e. the possibility to work with flexible hours and the box for ideas, that is a 
easier and anonymous way to collect new ideas from anyone in the firm, all evaluated as 
categorical ordered variables measured as Likert scales ranging from 1 to 5. In this way, it 
was possible to consider also the impact of the social activities actually accomplished by the 
sampled family firms. 
3.3 Data analysis 
Descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in this study are shown in 
Table 1. Sampled companies had average annual revenues of 15.3 million Euros and were on 
average 32 years old. 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
We regressed our data with a hierarchical logit model, controlling for possible 
correlation heteroskedasticity by using the Huber-White sandwich estimator clustered at 
industry-level. We performed Pearson goodness-of-fit test to assess whether the model is 
suitable, and in all the cases we rejected the null hypothesis that the model is not adequate. 
We also performed a number of sensitivity tests that are in-depth exposed in the Robustness 
checks section, to assess both robustness of theoretical premises and empirical findings. 
 
4. Results 





Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------- 
Model II significantly supports hypothesis 1, suggesting that family firms with higher 
family ownership are less likely to engage in CSR (β = -1.24, p < .01). As regards the effect 
of ownership dispersion among family members on CSR engagement, we find in Model III a 
significant negative effect (β = -.06, p < .01), thus supporting hypothesis 2. Finally, even the 
family generation involved in the business emerges as a variable with a significant effect from 
our analyses. The regression shows that the first generation has a positive and significant 
effect (β = .78, p < .01) on the dependent variable with respect to the later-generation variable, 
considered in the analysis as the base case; also the effect of the presence of second 
generation, with respect to the later-generation variable, on engagement in CSR, is significant 
and positive (β = 1.13, p < .01), as shown in Model IV. It is notable that the regression 
coefficient is higher for second generation stage than for the founder generation stage; we 
therefore performed also the regression using the first-generation dummy variable as the base 
case, but the regression result is not significant (β = 0.34, .10 < p < .15), thus suggesting that 
there are no significant differences between first- and second-generation family firms on 
engagement in CSR. Hypothesis 3 is thus partially supported, since both first-generation and 
second-generation family firms are more engaged in CSR than later-generation family 
businesses, while it is not possible to infer on the difference between first- and second-
generation family firms. Finally, it is worth noting that firms that internally install socially 
responsible initiatives, such as flexible hours of the box of ideas, consistently declare that they 
engage in CSR (significant positive results in all models).  
4.1 Robustness Checks 
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Overall, our analyses supported all the three hypotheses. Nevertheless, to ensure the 
robustness of the findings, we conducted additional analyses. 
We reran the models to check for the sensitivity of the results to the use of alternative 
measures for the independent variables. Specifically, family involvement in ownership is 
alternatively measured by considering dummy variables identified at different thresholds of 
family ownership concentration. We replicated the analyses by substituting the continuous 
measure of family involvement in ownership with the dummy variables obtained, 
respectively, at 30%, 50%, 70% and 90% of family ownership concentration. The results 
confirmed the findings of the main analysis with a negative and significant effect on the 
dependent variable, with the exception of the case where the threshold is set at 90%, that 
provided no significant effect1. 
In order to check possible differences between younger and older firms we separated the 
sample firms in two subsamples based on the median value of age and we replicated the 
analyses. The signs and significance of the coefficients of all variables relevant to our 
hypotheses were consistent with the main analysis, providing further support to the 
hypothesized relationships. 
Finally, we checked for the sensitivity of the findings to the use of alternative measures 
for firm size. We adopt both the logarithmic transformation of firm assets and the number of 
employees, and our conclusions regarding the hypotheses do not change, since in both the 
cases the effect of size on the dependent variable is not significant. 
 
5. Discussion 
The analysis presented herein supports the existence of a significant direct relationship 
between family involvement and engagement in CSR. The findings indicate that the 
                                                          
1 The results of the robustness checks are available upon request from the first author. 
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relationship between different dimensions of family involvement in the firm and engagement 
in corporate social responsibility is not trivial, and family firms differ from their nonfamily 
counterparts in CSR engagement. Accordingly, the findings of this study contribute to add 
new insights to previous findings, in the attempt to answer the rising calls for further and 
detailed research on social issues of family firms (Deniz and Suarez, 2005; Van Gils et al., 
2014; Wiklund, 2006), thus contributing to further understanding the social behavior of 
family firms, as well as shedding new lights on the ongoing debate on the heterogeneity of 
family firms (Chua et al., 2012; De Massis et al., 2014b). Our findings suggest that the 
presence of the family in the ownership structure of the firm has an impact on CSR 
engagement and such impact is multidimensional in scope, as both degree of family 
ownership and intra-family ownership dispersion, as well as the family generation in control, 
significantly affect the engagement of the firm in corporate social responsibility. The non-
invariant results of this research suggest that it is not possible to just compare family and non-
family businesses, entailing the former as a homogeneous sample of firms, which are 
expected to behave always in the same way. Family business research can benefit from 
studies in the field of CSR to in-depth analyze the drivers of family firms’ behavior, relying 
also on more specific concepts and theoretical views, like those looking at socioemotional 
wealth preservation (Chua, Chrisman, and De Massis, 2015; Gómez-Mejia et al., 2007). 
Indeed, the findings of this study suggest that a higher degree of family ownership leads 
to higher importance attached to family issues over business interests, and thus lower 
concerns and efforts to build formal relationships with the firm stakeholders, especially those 
who are distant from the daily activities of the family firm. Our findings thus suggest that 
self-interest arguments prevail over reputational ones when the degree of family ownership 
increases, contributing new insights to the ongoing debate on the role of reputation as a driver 
of family firms’ behavior (e.g., Deephouse and Jaskiewicz, 2013). Moreover, this finding 
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provides new hints to further discuss previous results showing that family firms invest in 
social responsible initiatives in order to protect their socioemotional endowments by 
enhancing their image and reputation in the community (Berrone et al., 2010); this study 
shows that reputation is not the only driver to understand family businesses’ social 
investments, but also self-interest can contrast and affect predictions on their behavior, thus 
contributing to understand heterogeneity among family firms, who may differently protect 
their socioemotional wealth.  
Moreover, the fact that firms with highly dispersed ownership appear to be less 
concerned about CSR issues further supports our contention that self-interest and agency 
issues play a crucial role in explaining the behavior of family firms and their attitude towards 
CSR. The findings showing a negative relationship between the number of owners of the 
family business and engagement in CSR imply that, when ownership is concentrated in the 
hands of few family members, the owners of the family firm invest more on building and 
maintaining firm reputation through CSR engagement aimed at satisfying long-term interests 
of all the stakeholders, and not only those of the family, as family wealth, career opportunities 
and corporate reputation are all linked to firm success. This is consistent with the idea that 
family firms are very proactive in the surrounding community with family owners tending to 
support and subsidize the institutions in the area and committed to the common good (Bird 
and Wennberg, 2014). Therefore, as few family members are expected to make decisions on 
how to invest in social initiatives, these efforts may be mainly philanthropic in nature, through 
donations of money, goods, or services to support a socially beneficial or humanitarian cause 
(Windsor, 2006). Many family firms, for example, create associations or foundations that are 
intended for these philanthropic purposes (Gallo, 2004).  
Finally, the effect of generational shifts during the family business life cycle is clear-cut 
and shows that the incoming of a new family generation in control of the business can change 
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engagement in CSR. Indeed, commitment to social issues associated with firm activities 
decreases across generations, suggesting that later-generation family firms are more 
concerned about transferring the business to the following generation and less concerned 
about family reputation. Accordingly, CSR loses its relevance as a strategy to engage in. 
6. Conclusions 
This study has shown that family involvement in the business has a direct effect on firm 
engagement in corporate social responsibility. In particular, our empirical evidence has shown 
that two different dimensions of family involvement in ownership, namely degree of family 
ownership and intra-family ownership dispersion, negatively affect CSR engagement. What is 
more, the generation at the helm of the family business is also important, since later 
generations engage less in corporate social responsibility. Theoretical arguments related to 
reputation and self-interest have been used to explain the behavior predicted by the models 
that we tested through regression analyses. 
Academics, practitioners and policy makers may benefit from the results of our study. 
First, it contributes to the family business literature, since scholars in the field have started 
only very recently to address the topic of CSR (Van Gils et al., 2014). The results of this 
study enable us to identify how different dimensions of family involvement affect the social 
behavior of family firms. The involvement of the family in the organization is a unique trait 
of family firms (De Massis et al., 2014b), and our study shows that each dimension of family 
involvement plays a crucial role in explaining engagement in CSR. More specifically, the 
importance of reputation among their stakeholders and the self-interest that characterizes 
family firms are two important drivers of CSR engagement. The study findings contribute to 
the ongoing debate on the heterogeneity of family firms (Chua et al., 2012). Moreover, we 
also contribute to the emerging stream of research on social issues in small- and medium-
sized family firms (e.g., Fitzgerald et al., 2010; Niehm et al., 2008). 
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Second, this study has implications for managers working in family firms, who are 
encouraged not to take for granted what corporate social responsibility handbooks propose as 
universally applicable good practices. They should carefully consider instead how different 
dimensions of family involvement in their business organization could affect the extent to 
which they engage in CSR and the effectiveness of these social practices, and how the related 
activities and norms should be revised to best suit the distinctive characteristics if the family 
firm. 
Finally, this research is expected to suit as a background policy document for policy 
makers. Corporate social responsibility initiatives are being paid increasing attention in the 
design of public policies, and particularly family firms, due to their ubiquity (Astrachan and 
Shanker, 2003; Anderson and Reeb, 2003), are considered critical for the growth of 
economies around the world (Villalonga and Amit, 2009; La Porta et al., 1999). In this 
respect, our study’s findings are useful since they suggest how to build a system of supporting 
initiatives for CSR that fits with the idiosyncratic characteristics of family firms. For example, 
the findings of our study may support policy makers in decisions regarding how to make 
family firms favor a socially responsible behavior. Nevertheless, we suggest being cautious, 
and considering that these results are valid in a specific regional context, and their 
generalization cannot be taken for granted. 
Our findings are original with regard to previous studies in that they untangle the direct 
effects of family involvement and also show that family involvement in ownership, intra-
family ownership dispersion and family generation in control hinder CSR engagement of 
small private family firms. Yet, as with all research, our results should be interpreted by 
acknowledging our study’s limitations. 
First, the sample used to perform the empirical analyses is modest in size, so it is not 
straightforward to generalize the findings to all private small- and medium-sized family firms, 
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and there is therefore room for additional studies to support our contention. Second, our 
analysis is cross-sectional, thus causal relationships can be questionable; therefore, it would 
be interesting to analyze the relationships under investigation over time in a longitudinal 
study in order to provide additional insights into the ways in which the evolution in the 
dimension of family involvement affects private small- and medium-sized family firms’ 
engagement in CSR. Moreover, the dependent variable of our study – namely engagement in 
CSR – can be measured in a different way, for example adopting a Likert scale to have more 
nuanced information on family firms’ engagement.  
In light of the results of our study and the above mentioned limits that are still to be 
addressed, further investigation of the ways in which family involvement affects private 
small- and medium-sized family firms’ engagement in CSR deserves further attention. First, 
replicating this study on a sample of both family and nonfamily firms may enable scholars as 
well as owners of family firms to gain further insights on the relationship between family 
involvement and engagement in CSR. Second, what is CSR and how firms behave in a social 
responsible manner is strongly dependent on cultural aspects, like values and traditions that 
differentiate countries (Scholtens and Dam, 2007), religion (Brammer, Williams, and Zinkin, 
2007), tradition and legacy in the families (Marques, Presas, and Simon, 2014). Although 
there are some articles analyzing CSR in studies comparing different contexts, such as the 
Chinese context as compared to the Western one (Xu and Yang, 2010), studying family 
business CSR in different cultural contexts, in order to identify whether and to what extent 
different levels of involvement and diverse conceptions of family are relevant to explain 
corporate social behaviors, is an area ripe for future research. 
In addition, beyond the knowledge and diffusion of CSR within family firms, a related 
and interesting topic for future investigation relates to social performances. Specifically, it 
would be interesting to find whether the accomplishment of socially responsible initiatives 
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affects social and economic performances of family firms. We hope that this study will 
encourage future work contributing to this field at the intersection of CSR and family 
business. 
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Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1. Family Ownership (%) 0.93 0.17            
2. Intra-family 
Ownership Dispersion 3.32 2.11 .09           
3. First Generation 
(dummy) 0.26 0.44 -.07 .02          
4. Second Generation 
(dummy) 0.54 0.50 .14 .03 -.63**         
5. Age (log) 3.34 0.57 -.03 .20* .08 -.09        
6. Firm Size (log) 9.03 1.10 -.01 .19* -.04 -.02 .27**       
7. Industry (dummy) 0.71 0.45 -.06 -.01 -.04 .03 -.01 -05      
8. Performance -15.16 113.96 .10 .01 -.05 .13 -.07 -.00 .04     
9. Adoption of flexible 
hours 3.42 1.10 .01 .01 .08 -.23** .07 .01 -.05 .07    
10. Adoption of box of 
ideas 3.79 1.06 -.03 -.18* .06 -.22** .10 .01 .04 -.01 .08   
11. Agreement with 
Family Goals 4.10 0.96 -.16 .11 -.02 -.05 .17* .05 -.07 .02 .02 .02  
12. Engagement in CSR  0.63 0.48 -.10 -.05 .01 .06 .12 -.03 -.06 .09 .07 .12 .06 
N = 136 observations 
*p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 2. Hierarchic Logit Regression for CSR Engagement in Family Firms 
 
Engagement in CSR 
Variable I II III IV 
Age 0.326** 0.324** 0.348** 0.306† 
 
(0.0592) (0.0523) (0.0624) (0.160) 
Firm Size -0.0420 -0.0463 -0.0348 -0.0802 
 
(0.133) (0.145) (0.149) (0.173) 
Performance -0.00395* -0.00398† -0.00419* -0.00492* 
 
(0.00180) (0.00208) (0.00213) (0.00205) 
Adoption of flexible hours 0.110* 0.112* 0.120* 0.251** 
 
(0.0381) (0.0526) (0.0610) (0.0199) 
Adoption of box of ideas 0.221† 0.219* 0.200† 0.341** 
 
(0.117) (0.106) (0.119) (0.0886) 
Agreement with Family Goals 0.102** 0.0672** 0.0785** 0.0964* 
 
(0.00140) (0.0123) (0.00824) (0.0375) 
Family Ownership (%) 
 
-1.244** -1.197** -1.434** 
  
(0.0720) (0.0916) (0.0432) 
Intra-family Ownership Dispersion 
  
-0.0569** -0.0358* 
   
(0.0143) (0.0152) 
First Generation (dummy) 
   
0.785** 
    
(0.167) 
Second Generation (dummy) 
   
1.127** 
    
(0.0583) 
Constant -1.807 -0.451 -0.498 -2.271 
 
(2.066) (2.046) (2.144) (2.514) 
Observations 128 128 128 126 
Pseudo R2 0.0234 0.0315 0.0326 0.0529 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, † p<0.1 
      
